A brief profile: Who is Makebi Zulu?

Analytical Report: Makebi Zulu and the Zambian Constitutional Crisis

Mar. 23, 2026 /Mpelembe Media/ — This is a biographical record for Makebi Zulu, a prominent Zambian politician and lawyer. It details his professional qualifications, his tenure in the National Assembly, and his affiliation with the Patriotic Front party. It illustrates the intersection of individual political leadership and macroeconomic governance within the country.

1. Professional and Political Profile of Makebi Zulu

Makebi Zulu occupies a pivotal position within the Zambian legal and political spheres, representing a synthesis of high-level legislative experience and seasoned legal practice. Born on December 25, 1981, Zulu’s academic foundations were established at the University of Zambia, where he obtained his Bachelor of Laws (LLB) in 2005. His subsequent admission to the Zambian Bar in 2006 marked the beginning of nearly two decades of practice as an Advocate of the High Court. This veteran status within the Zambian legal fraternity is foundational to his current role as a critic, providing him with the professional seniority and historical perspective necessary to challenge what he characterizes as an increasingly “timid” judiciary.His political trajectory is defined by his tenure in the 12th National Assembly (2016–2021), during which he served as the Member of Parliament for Malambo under the Patriotic Front (PF) banner. His dual identity as a legislator and a senior advocate allows him to deconstruct government policy through both a political and a technical legal lens.

Politician: Former Member of the National Assembly for Malambo (12th Assembly) and prominent member of the Patriotic Front.

Lawyer: Distinguished legal practitioner with approximately 19 years of experience in the Zambian courts.

Advocate of the High Court: A senior member of the Bar, admitted in 2006, whose extensive experience informs his advocacy for judicial independence.

2. Legal Analysis: Opposition to Constitution (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025

As a scholar and practitioner, Zulu characterizes Constitution (Amendment) Bill No. 7 of 2025 as a “retrogressive” instrument that threatens the fundamental tenets of Zambian democracy.

The By-Election Controversy

Zulu’s most vehement opposition is directed at the proposal to allow political parties to replace Members of Parliament without a by-election. He argues this mechanism “betrays the rights of the individual to choose a leader through the ballot.” Beyond the legal abstraction, Zulu identifies a darker political motive: the use of party “firing” or internal coercion—which he colloquially likens to “witchcraft”—to remove dissenting MPs and replace them with party loyalists who lack a popular mandate. He views this as a defensive maneuver by “incumbent dinosaurs” to insulate themselves from the challenges of a younger, more dynamic generation of leaders seeking to enter the National Assembly.

Civil Service Standards

The amendment’s proposal to reduce the experience requirement for the Secretary to Cabinet from 10 years to 5 years of service as a Permanent Secretary is viewed by Zulu as a strategic “watering down” of state management. He contends this is an attempt to institutionalize “caderism” within professional workplaces, essentially tailoring the law to fit specific individuals who lack the requisite expertise, thereby undermining the meritocratic foundations of the Zambian civil service.

The Incumbency Critique

Zulu asserts that the amendments are not a response to national necessity but are designed to “shield or protect” the incumbent executive. He characterizes the bill as an effort to manipulate the constitutional framework to “maintain the status quo” and ensure the continuation of the current administration’s grip on power, rather than answering to the genuine aspirations of the citizenry.

3. The 2026 Presidential Eligibility and Democratic Framework

Zulu advocates for a comprehensive reimagining of the Zambian democratic process, contrasting his “human rights approach” with the executive’s perceived “cowardice” in avoiding direct electoral accountability.Zulu proposes a transition toward a “mixed-member” electoral system, combining Proportional Representation with the traditional “First Past the Post” model. He maintains that a popular president must meet the “50 plus one” requirement to ensure a clear national mandate. Furthermore, Zulu emphasizes that constitutional reform should focus on Part III of the Constitution —the Bill of Rights. He argues that the right to water, health, and education should be justiciable, forcing the government to provide these services as a matter of constitutional obligation rather than political patronage.”These amendments are not answering to the aspirations of the Zambians; they are answering to the aspirations of an individual… and that shouldn’t be the case.” — Sun FM/TV Interview

4. Human Rights and the Rule of Law under the UPND Administration

Zulu’s assessment of current civil liberties suggests a systematic erosion of the rule of law, characterized by what he terms “rule by terror.”

Breach of Legal Timelines

Zulu highlights a frequent disregard for constitutional protections regarding detention. He notes that while the law requires the police to charge a suspect within 48 hours and present them before a court within 24 hours of that charge, the current administration frequently ignores these timelines. He alleges that the investigative wings—the Drug Enforcement Commission (DEC), the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC), and the Police—now operate under direct executive pressure to deny bond or bail to political opponents.

Institutional Independence and Double Standards

Central to his critique is Gazette Notice 1123 , which consolidated the DEC, ACC, and Police under the Office of the President. Zulu argues this has neutralized these bodies, leading to a “double standard” in law enforcement. He cites the incident involving the UPND Secretary General (“Amenda”) and his “Lucifer” comments regarding Catholic Bishop Bander; Zulu notes that while opposition figures like Mabonga are jailed for responding to provocations, ruling party officials face no legal consequences for similar or worse rhetoric.

Zulu’s Human Rights Assessment

Government Promises,Observed Realities

Innocent until proven guilty,Direct executive instructions to deny bond/bail

End to political victimization,”Jailing of opposition (e.g., Mabonga) and brutality (e.g., Emanuel Mamba)”

Respect for freedom of expression,Use of Cyber Security Act to monitor private lives and stifle dissent

Independence of investigative wings,Gazette Notice 1123 places DEC/ACC/Police under the Presidency

5. Macroeconomic Context and the Debt Narrative

Zulu’s political narrative on the economy presents a stark contrast to the empirical data found in the 2026 Pre-Budget Survey Report (KPMG/UNDP) .

The Debt Dispute

Zulu contends that under the PF, debt rose from $3 billion to $11.9 billion, but has surged to $21 billion under the UPND (citing IMF figures). He dismisses government claims of debt restructuring as a “lie” designed for political survival. However, technical data from the KPMG/UNDP report provides a more complex picture: while external debt reached $ 23.1 billion as of August 2025, the report notes that by March 2025, the government had successfully restructured 92% of this debt, leading to a moderate increase in business confidence (77% satisfaction).

Cost of Living and Inflationary Pressures

Zulu focuses on the tangible failure of price-stability promises. He notes the Kwacha has depreciated from a promised 12 to 26 per dollar. More critically, he cites the escalating cost of essentials:

Mealie-meal: Increased from K170 to over K250.

Fertilizer: Rose from K600 to K1,200.

Fuel: Increased from K12 to over K30.This narrative of hardship is supported by the KPMG/UNDP report, which acknowledges “persistent inflationary pressures” (12.6% y-o-y in August 2025, exceeding the 8NDP target of 6-8%) and notes that exchange rate volatility remains the primary negative impact on business performance.

6. Conclusion: Implications for the 2026 Constitutional Landscape

The Zambian political landscape is currently defined by a zero-sum tension between the UPND’s “fiscal consolidation” and the opposition’s allegations of “constitutional manipulation.” While the KPMG report suggests progress in debt management, Zulu argues that such gains are irrelevant if the democratic foundation is compromised. The perceived backsliding on human rights and the alignment of the 8th National Development Plan (8NDP) targets with administrative amendments suggests a precarious path toward the 2026 elections.Zulu identifies the following as the most critical constitutional risks:

Erosion of the Right to Vote: The replacement of MPs via party appointment effectively nullifies the individual’s right to choose through the ballot.

Dilution of Civil Service Professionalism: The reduction of experience requirements for the Secretary to Cabinet risks institutionalizing “caderism” at the highest levels of administration.

Suppression of Dissent: The continued use of the Cyber Security Act and the consolidation of investigative wings under the presidency create a framework for stifling opposition.

7. Technical References

2026 Pre-Budget Survey Report – Zambia: Collaborative report by KPMG Zambia and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), September 2025.

A brief profile: Who is Makebi Zulu?: Biographical data from the Mpelembe Network.

Sun FM/TV Interview Transcript: “Hon. Makebi Zulu Speaks Out on Key National Issues,” uploaded by J Cool.

Makebi Zulu – Wikidata: Professional credentials, political history, and biographical data.