The Architecture of Agency: A Comparative Report on Moral Subjectivity and Responsibility

1. Introduction: The Evolving Taxonomy of Moral Agency

As autonomous systems, complex corporate structures, and new insights into animal ethology challenge our traditional ethical boundaries, the strategic importance of defining “moral agency” has never been greater. For centuries, the domain of moral participation was reserved almost exclusively for the human rational agent. However, as non-human entities increasingly occupy roles of significant social and ethical consequence—ranging from AI-driven healthcare diagnostics to the legal personhood of corporations—we must move beyond a species-centric model. To maintain a functional moral community, we must examine the specific functional requirements that allow an entity to participate in moral life, regardless of its biological or structural origin.The “Orthodox View” of moral agency traditionally rests on three pillars: the capacity to distinguish right from wrong, the ability to make autonomous choices, and the liability to be held accountable for those actions. Under this framework, an agent is not merely an object of concern (a moral patient) but a participant capable of being praised or blamed. As we shall see, this benchmark remains the foundation upon which all other comparative frameworks are built, though the boundaries are increasingly porous. Continue reading →